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ABSTRACT

A SOCIAL MEDIA MISINFORMATION LABEL AND THE POSTRHETORICAL
PRESIDENCY

Ethan McGinty
English Department
Bachelor of Arts

In May 2020, presidential communication on social media was—for the first
time—subject to a misinformation label applied by the social media site on which the
communication originated. This development indicates a turning point in social media
sites’ relationship with presidential communication and demands adaptation in the
scholarly understanding of presidential rhetoric during the present era. Drawing from the
theoretical framework of the postrhetorical presidency, I perform dual rhetorical analyses
of this landmark artifact. The first round of analysis ignores the label and analyzes the
presidential communication alone to understand its function, while the second analysis
reveals the rhetorical impact of social media intervention on postrhetorical presidential
communication by highlighting how the misinformation label alters the function of the
artifact as described in the initial analysis. I then describe three takeaways that may aid to
advance the study of presidential rhetoric as we enter into this new era of social media
intervention in presidential communication.
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Introduction
Social media, misinformation, and presidential rhetoric collided on Jan. 6, 2021 to
instigate a historic tragedy at the United States Capitol (Leatherby et al.). The nation
watched as hundreds of protestors and rioters stormed the Capitol building, leaving five
dead and over a hundred injured (Healy). Many of those that forced entry into the halls of
Congress to interrupt the certification of a presidential election had traveled from across
the country, believing their actions justified by a perception of fraud in the election of the
next president—a belief that had been repeatedly stoked and encouraged by President
Trump himself (West). For weeks and months before the event, and even before the
election, Trump had taken to social media to blast voting systems and locations as
fraudulent—leading to his call for the rioters to “fight like hell” lest they “not . . . have a
country anymore” (Trump). In an extended political season characterized by
misinformation about everything from elections to public health and everything in
between, no other occurrence so memorably captured the dangerous interplay of
presidential rhetoric on social media as the events of Jan. 6, 2021.
In the fallout from this event, Trump found himself removed from Twitter,
Facebook, and other social media sites. Still desirous to reach his supporters, he formed a
blog, experimented with alternative sites, and filed lawsuits against the big tech
companies that banned him (Bond). The enormity of just what was wrought over the past
several months by a twiddle of thumbs has many asking if Trump should be allowed to
rejoin the conversation on social media platforms, if he ever should have been banned
from them, and how such a national tragedy was brought about. How is it that a president
can fabricate claims of fraud without evidence and, simply by repeating them with a loud
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enough megaphone, still have a quarter of the nation convinced months later that an
election was rigged (“Republicans View Trump as President”)?
The answer, to my view, lies in the unique powers and modern developments of
the postrhetorical presidency—of which Donald J. Trump’s rhetoric provides a valuable
example. The former president’s Twitter postings, a staple of his tenure in the Oval
Office that kept him in constant contact with the public with minimal moderation, are an
archive of postrhetorical presidential communication. While the extensive use of social
media is not unique to Trump among recent presidents, President Trump’s unceasing
social media interaction takes it to a next level. He rallies his supporters and attacks his
critics while applying pressure to legislative bodies with an aggressive evolution of the
postrhetorical style that elicits public response and censorship by Twitter and other social
media companies. In this paper, I will provide an overview of the postrhetorical
presidency as a rhetorical theory and provide rhetorical analysis of a keystone artifact in
President Trump’s postrhetorical use of Twitter. In my analysis, I intend to demonstrate
how President Trump’s tweets epitomize postrhetorical presidential communication and
will consider their effectiveness first without and then with Twitter’s intervention. Using
the insights generated from my analysis, I will then provide three takeaways on how
critical conceptions of postrhetorical presidential rhetoric may be expanded to account for
direct social media intervention and censorship in presidential communication.
The Postrhetorical Presidency
The postrhetorical presidency is a theoretical explanation of the rhetorical manner
in which the President of the United States communicates with the American public and
achieves his political agenda. The theory of a postrhetorical presidency emerged over the
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past decade as an extension of the rhetorical presidency first described by James Caesar,
Glen Thurow, Jeffrey Tulis, and Joseph Bessette in 1981 and further detailed in Tulis’s
1987 The Rhetorical Presidency. This theory describes a transition in the rhetorical style
and strategy of the President of the United States from the founding of the nation to the
late 20th century. Modern scholarship, most notably that of Jennifer Mercieca and
Stephen Hartnett, has extended this theoretical framework into the 21st century to
demonstrate how presidents today are making use of the ‘bully pulpit’ in their political
messaging. The American journey towards developing this system of presidential
communication and identifying it as “postrhetorical” passes through three distinct phases
of presidential rhetoric—periods that may be referred to as the foundational presidency,
the rhetorical presidency, and the postrhetorical presidency. To best illustrate the nature
of postrhetorical presidential communication, I will briefly discuss them each in turn.
During the 18th and 19th centuries, presidents achieved their political ends through
an approach that I will call the foundational presidency. This approach to presidential
communication began with the founding of the United States and is recognized by Tulis
as extending until the 1901–1909 presidency of Theodore Roosevelt (Tulis 4). During
this century and a quarter, presidents were rhetorically distant from the general
population—delivering their addresses to legislators and other members of government to
achieve their political ends without involving public citizens (5, 62). This rhetorical
distance was not mere presidential habit or preference but the systemic expectation of
how the presidential office performed its duties—the president was expected to maintain
distance from the public to prevent the rise of populism, demagoguery, and other political
ills (25, 61). Presidential communication to the public, such as during inaugural
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addresses, declarations of war or emergency, or monument dedications, were primarily
ceremonial in nature and intended to promote patriotic feeling instead of further any
particular policy agenda (62). Though the practice of visiting various areas of the country
has been a presidential staple since George Washington, early presidents did not perform
a great many public speeches during these tours nor with the same approach as today’s
campaigning politicians (63–5). As a striking example of the fundamental difference
between presidential rhetoric during this foundational period and that of today’s
postrhetorical period, only 4 out of the first 24 U.S. presidents performed a speech before
the public that attacked or defended a particular legislative policy (67). This period is best
identified by an expectation of rhetorical distance between president and public, and a
lack of policy-based communication between these two actors.
The rhetorical presidency emerged during the early 20th century as presidents
began to intentionally present their policies and ideals to the American people (Tulis 4).
Presidents Theodore Roosevelt, William H. Taft, and Woodrow Wilson fundamentally
changed the president’s rhetorical role and power by ever more consistently using the
public as a means of pressuring Congress to support their policy proposals and initiatives
(4). Informing the public of proposed policy, and interpreting Congressional debate on
the subject, became a crucial function of the president’s office (127). By demonstrating
the effectiveness of presidential communication with the public, this string of presidents
developed a new requirement of the successful executive: “the doctrine that a president
ought to be a popular leader” (4). This shift in approach caused the position of president
to develop a reciprocal relationship with the press: the president providing the news to
draw in viewers, and the press providing access to a vast audience (Tulis 15–16;
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Mercieca 209–10). Public accessibility to mass media, such as newspapers, radio, and
television, encouraged this rhetorical shift by allowing presidential messages to easily
and rapidly reach huge numbers of Americans (Tulis 186). Such a relationship between
the press and the presidency allowed for 20th century presidents to achieve a relationship
with the American people that had never before been seen or expected of them. Towards
the end of this period, a perceived intimacy between the president and the public became
not only beneficial to the president’s rhetorical objectives but required of him to maintain
his audience’s respect and support—it became a duty of the president to communicate
clearly and regularly with the public (128, 132–4). It is vital to note, however, that during
this period the press and the president’s office itself acted as screens between the
president and the American people: his messages were transmitted to the public by a
courier and in such a capacity that limited his expression to particular forms and
constructions, instead of a truly free communicative intimacy (132–6, 188). This period
breaks the restrictive norms of the foundational period and encourages the president to
communicate with the public to raise support for his policies and proposals; it blends
seamlessly into the early years of the postrhetorical period.
Hartnett and Mercieca identify the postrhetorical presidency as having first
emerged during the presidency of George W. Bush (600) and having become central to
modern politics during the presidency of Barack Obama (207–8)—to which I would add
that it has become a (if not the) defining characteristic of the presidency of Donald
Trump. In a postrhetorical style of communication, the president “use[s] social media to
go over the heads of Congress and around the news filter to speak directly to supporters”
(Hartnett and Mercieca 207). Through such methods, presidents have achieved a truly
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constant, public intimacy in their communication with the American people. Thus the
communication becomes “postrhetorical” in the sense that there is less need for—and far
less emphasis given to—classical, formal expressions of presidential rhetoric. Any
distinction there may have been between ‘official’ statements or discourse and
‘unofficial’ banter or commentary in previous periods has all but disappeared as
presidents become as much public celebrities as they are political actors (Gronbeck 45–
6). This change in communication media also causes presidents to “see[k] to define the
bounds of political discourse . . . by marshaling ubiquitous public chatter, waves of
disinformation, and cascades of confusion-causing misdirection” (Hartnett and Merceica
600). In this sense, modern presidencies are “postrhetorical” because they may seek to
obscure and complicate public discourse, instead of streamlining or advancing it (600).
These alterations of presidential communication are made possible and effective
by the advent of the internet and the enormous popularity of social media (Hartnett and
Mercieca 600–1). By personally communicating with the public through social media
instead of through the press, the president is able to reach his audience instantly, with
great consistency and intimacy, and without being intrinsically filtered or analyzed during
the initial act of communication (Mercieca 213–4). While the press and others are still
very much involved in transmitting, recording, and analyzing the rhetoric and actions of
the president, the president is no longer dependent upon the press to maintain his
connection with the public—in fact, what was once a cordial and symbiotic relationship
between the Oval Office and mainstream media outlets has now become strained and, at
times, bitter (212). By posting on social media accounts and sharing mass messages
through email and text, the president can deliver his rhetoric directly and immediately to
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an enormous audience without any dependency or filter.
The opportunities presented by a postrhetorical presidency have been
implemented in various fashions by recent presidents. The 2008 Obama campaign has
been lauded extensively for its adoption and use of social media, a move that allowed it
to build and engage with a vast coalition of voters (Carr). After winning the presidency,
Obama’s White House became even more committed to reaching Americans on social
media: the president created the official @POTUS Twitter account, went Live on
Facebook, answered questions on YouTube, and even shared filtered photos on Snapchat
(Schulman). Obama’s presidency demonstrated the “independent, competitive, and
unstable relationship [with] the press” that characterizes the postrhetorical presidency
(Mercieca 215). As Mercieca has observed, “his enactment of the postrhetorical
presidency relied upon strict message control, speaking directly to supporters, and
counting on ‘friends’ and ‘followers’ to circulate his messages throughout their
networks,” occasionally even electing to not air notable speeches on live television in
favor of social media (221). As the first social media president, Barack Obama made the
playbook for his successors to follow.
Coming into the Oval Office right after President Obama, President Trump
inherited the official accounts created by his predecessor and set them to work right
alongside his own personal social media. Similar to Obama, Trump’s take on the
postrhetorical presidency brought him into contention with traditional media—though
Trump proved to be markedly more outright antagonistic than Obama. While President
Obama would occasionally snub reporters, give priority to social media, and provide
lengthy answers difficult to cut into headline-size chunks (Milligan), Trump never
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attended a Correspondents’ Dinner (Farhi), threatened a reporter with prison (Itkowitz),
and called journalists everything from “dishonest” to “corrupt” to “human scum” and
“the worst human beings you’ll ever meet” (“Trump Administration and Media”). This
combative relationship with the press merged with the postrhetorical ability to obfuscate
truth and fantasy (Hartnett and Mercieca 600) as Trump discouraged his supporters from
trusting mainstream media, constantly referring to them as “fake news media”
(@realDonaldTrump, 11 Nov. 2020, 9:03 a.m.) or “lamestream media”
(@realDonaldTrump, 8 Nov. 2020, 1:52 p.m.). Sowing distrust in mainstream media
sources—and broadcasting his own take on news and policy to his millions of Twitter
followers—constituted constant postrhetorical communication during Trump’s tenure in
the Oval Office.
Introduction to Analysis
President Trump’s Twitter communications, inseparable from national headlines
and political discussion for the past several years, have demonstrated the powers and
constraints of the postrhetorical presidency. He has used social media to pressure
Congress (Mercieca 213–4), bypass mainstream media filters and create audience
intimacy (217), and obfuscate reality (Hartnett and Mercieca 600). For the purposes of
my discussion, since the collected tweetings of President Trump would be too large a
subject to discuss in the scope of this paper, I have selected a single text that exemplifies
the postrhetorical nature of the wider collection: a two-post thread on election fraud
preceding the 2020 presidential election (@realDonaldTrump. 26 May 2020, 8:17 a.m.).
This artifact is remarkable for being the first instance in which a directly-intervening
misinformation label was applied to presidential communication on social media (Fung).
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Such a direct intervention on the part of a social media outlet into presidential
communication represents a turning point in postrhetorical presidential communication.
While the constraints of traditional electronic medias such as radio and television have
been extensively analyzed in the theoretical context of the rhetorical presidency (Tulis
186–8; Gronbeck 41–5), it has so far been the scholarly consensus that social media
permits presidential rhetoric to significantly bypass media filters in appealing to the
public (Hartnett and Mercieca 603; Mercieca 207; Smith 133–4). The artifact that I have
selected, with its accompanying site-imposed label, provides the first example of how
social media sites can filter presidential rhetoric and allows for a unique opportunity to
explore the rhetorical presidency’s interaction with such intervention. A rhetorical
analysis of this text in the theoretical light of the postrhetorical presidency has the
potential to teach volumes concerning the future of postrhetorical presidential
communication on social media in this newly-altered landscape.
I will perform my rhetorical analysis of the selected artifact over two rounds and
in the mode defined by David Zarefsky for the field of presidential rhetoric. This method
of analysis aims to provide insight into a rhetorical artifact’s function and meaning
through consideration of how a speaker’s choices achieve their goals in the context of a
specific situation (Zarefsky 608–9). During the first portion of my analysis—that
ignoring the applied misinformation label—I will primarily focus on the relationship
between rhetor and artifact to identify key rhetorical moves embodied in the text and
presumably selected with intention by the speaker (609). My hope is that this first round
of analysis will provide insight into the function of the text on its presumed audiences as
intended by the speaker, President Trump—in direct correspondence to Zarefsky’s
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second “dimension” of rhetorical analysis (609). I hope, through this first analysis, to
describe a ‘base function’ of this text that may be contrasted with the results of my
second analysis to isolate the impact of Twitter’s misinformation label.
My second round of analysis will take into consideration Twitter’s
misinformation label. When I considered how to analyze this aspect of the text, I found
myself required to shape my approach in one of two ways: I could consider the Twitter
label as a separate rhetorical object crafted in response to Trump’s posts, or I could
consider the label as a member of the artifact and inextricable from Trump’s posts. Since
I wish to focus primarily on presidential rhetoric and the effects upon such by the
intervention of media between the speaker and his audience, I have elected to analyze the
posts and their label together as a single text and without a consideration of Twitter as an
independent, responding rhetor. I believe that such an approach will allow for the most
appropriate consideration of the artifact as it functions and allow me to analyze how it
may have been read after the label was applied, at which time audiences would have
encountered the post and label conjointly and as a single object. During this round of
analysis, my approach will most closely correspond to Zarefsky’s third dimension of
rhetorical analysis—I will be considering the artifact’s entire meaning and effect as
embodied within itself, present to be considered as an artifact independent of its direct
relationship with its creators (Zarefsky 609). Consequently, my language will shift from
focusing on the authors’ intentions or choices to that of audience reaction (though I have
no original data to describe such empirically, as Zarefsky indicates would be most
appropriate in a true analysis of audience reception) (609). I hope, through this shift in
language, to accommodate the conflicting motivations of the multiple rhetors that led to
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this hybrid object, which may be confusing to approach through the speaker-centric
language I will make use of during my first analysis. My primary objective in this dual
rhetorical analysis is to reveal how the intentions of a presidential rhetor were hindered
and opposed by the imposition of social media intervention and the consequential
alteration of this artifact of the postrhetorical presidency.
The Rhetorical Situation
I will begin my discussion of the selected artifact with the rhetorical situation in
which Trump composed and published my selected artifact—the speaker, goals,
audiences, exigencies, and constraints.
Speaker: To any person recently engaged in the realms of social media, politics,
or presidential rhetoric, the political persona of Donald J. Trump will not be unknown.
The 45th President of the United States, Trump makes for a divisive political figure whose
rhetorical styles range from hours-long rally speeches to bursts of all-caps posts
consisting of only a few lines. Any tweets that I have selected to reference are presented
as direct communications by Donald Trump himself via his @realDonaldTrump account.
This account, separate from the official government @WhiteHouse and @POTUS
accounts, is the personal account of Donald Trump and often gives the impression of
being less moderated by aides and advisors than the official office accounts, being more
prone to spark public pushback and to engage in heated exchanges with other users.
Though it is not necessarily the case that President Trump typed out each message with
his own thumbs—having an official White House Director of Social Media, Dan Scavino,
who was known to write and take dictated messages for the @realDonaldTrump
account—this should be considered as no different from any other politician making use
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of speech writers in the creation of their remarks (Chute). There has been no recorded
instance in which Scavino was claimed to have posted something to the account against
the president’s wishes nor anything that has been denounced or contradicted by the
president after posting as the work of another, so it may be assumed that all posts to this
account were actively or tacitly authorized by the account owner. Though the Twitter
account and the man are not one and the same, for the purposes of my analysis, I will be
considering Donald Trump’s Twitter presence as an extension of his own rhetorical self.
Goals: Like most users of social media, Trump posts to Twitter with the hopes of
attracting attention and support to his ideas and personal image—in the case of his posts
claiming fraud in the 2020 presidential election (such as my selected artifact), Trump’s
goal is to convince his supporters and the public that the election was fraudulent and
unreliable. The text I will consider, posted on May 26th, targets mail-in voting as such a
potential source of fraud. The intent of these posts would seem to be questioning and
casting doubt upon the methods and processes of the election in sufficient strength to
impact the public’s perception of such voting systems and the legitimacy of the election
overall. The end goal of such an attempt, as with nearly any political messaging in the
months prior to an election, is to gather electoral support and degrade enemies to increase
chances of election victory.
Audiences: The audiences that President Trump addresses from his Twitter
account can be roughly divided into three groups: his supporters on Twitter, all other
users on Twitter, and all other secondary audiences encountering his tweets through other
sources. First, and often explicitly addressed by Trump, are his supporters. The vast
majority of Trump’s tweets surrounding the election seem intended to convince his
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supporters that there has been fraud, that there is proof of such fraud, and that he (Trump)
will still prevail despite this fraud. These posts can come with reassurances—“WE WILL
WIN! America First!” (@realDonaldTrump. 5 Nov. 2020, 11:22 a.m.)—and with calls to
action—“WATCH FOR MASSIVE BALLOT COUNTING ABUSE”
(@realDonaldTrump. 10 Nov. 2020, 10:33 a.m.)—but most importantly serve to reiterate
claims that fraud has occurred. Second, Trump posts to a general Twitter audience; these
posts do not as explicitly target themselves at his supporters but are certainly wellreceived by them, putting forward more general claims setting forward the President’s
interpretation of events. Such posts as “71,000,000 Legal Votes. The most EVER for a
sitting President!” (@realDonaldTrump. 7 Nov. 2020, 4:54 a.m.) do not seek
identification with sympathetic supporters or directions for the same but are presented as
statements of fact intended to posit the occurrence of fraud without assuming a
supportive predisposition. The effective scope of a general, non-supporter Twitter
audience likely to accept the president’s messaging is mostly composed of moderates and
conservatives. Given the politically-divisive figure that he tends to cut and the current
trend towards polarization and partisanship in American politics, it is unlikely that Trump
would be concerned about targeting any messaging besides attacks at the American Left,
as it is nearly inconceivable that he could bring any to his side.
Third, we must briefly consider the perhaps-unintended audience of those who do
not see these posts on Twitter but through other media, like news outlets or alternative
social media. This audience is interesting, though challenging, to consider from my
declared perspective of postrhetorical presidential communication, as the source in which
an audience member encounters the text may or may not provide immediate
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interpretation or ideological framing that would counteract the postrhetorical nature of
the communication and thereby alter the appropriate reading. Screenshots of tweets
shared to other social media may come with varied amounts of intervening interpretation,
ranging from an Instagram caption to a lengthy Facebook post, and news programs that
covered these tweets during the period of the election provided extensive commentary,
often either explicitly supporting or discounting the President’s claims. For its
incompatibility with a postrhetorical analysis and its extremely varied nature, I will be
excluding consideration of this audience from my analysis of President Trump’s tweets
and focusing on audiences that encounter the posts on Twitter.
Exigencies: Donald Trump began to post concerning election fraud months
before the 2020 general election occurred to respond to the exigency of his projected
election loss. Even months before the election, Trump was trailing Biden in the polls and
was not projected to have a strong probability of victory (“National Overview”). Though
the election proved to be closer than predicted by many such polls, the rhetorical situation
leading up to November was one in which a Trump victory was considered unlikely,
requiring rhetorical action on the part of the president. Due to the high number of mail-in
and early-voting ballots cast during the COVID-19 pandemic, and the strong correlation
between these adaptive voting methods and their predominant support for the Democratic
opposition, Trump’s rhetorical move seems to seek the creation of mistrust in the systems
most likely to inhibit his victory. The slew of messaging and posts claiming fraud that
occurred after the election results were announced, a natural outgrowth of the artifact
considered today, was a response to the exigency of his electoral loss that built upon his
previous claims (Sandler).

14

Constraints: In creating his Twitter postings claiming fraud in the 2020 general
election, the most notable constraints Donald Trump faced were those determined by the
social media site itself. Simply by posting on Twitter, Trump faces a constraint of
message length: 280 characters. Though he does occasionally string together a series of
tweets to form a longer message (as in the text I have chosen), each post by itself is
character-capped and therefore posted as a separate object. While this is a universal
constraint experienced by all users of the platform, President Trump discovered another
constraint that is not as commonly seen: Twitter’s policies on misinformation labeled and
blocked the visibility of many of his posts that they deemed to violate their policies
against the spread of political misinformation. This already-present but newlyencountered constraint greatly impacted the effectiveness of Trump’s claims and
messaging on this platform by restricting the latitude of claims he could make without
being tagged as potentially misinformative, an action that certainly impacts the audience
reception of his message (“Civic Integrity Policy”). It is this constraint, the application of
misinformation labels and censorship on presidential rhetoric, that I intend to make the
focus of my commentary.
A Presidential Misinformation Label
The first time a tweet of President Trump was labeled as potentially
misinformative demonstrates key aspects of social media censorship’s impact on
postrhetorical presidential communication. The post in question, actually two tweets sent
out in rapid succession on May 26, 2020, reads as follows:
There is NO WAY (ZERO!) that Mail-In Ballots will be anything less than
substantially fraudulent. Mail boxes will be robbed, ballots will be forged & even
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illegally printed out & fraudulently signed. The Governor of California is sending
Ballots to millions of people, anyone…..
….living in the state, no matter who they are or how they got there, will get one.
That will be followed up with professionals telling all of these people, many of
whom have never even thought of voting before, how, and for whom, to vote.
This will be a Rigged Election. No way! (@realDonaldTrump. 26 May 2020, 8:17
a.m.)
Both of these tweets were labeled by Twitter with a bright subscript inviting readers
encountering them to “Get the facts about mail-in ballots” (Fung) The label linked to a
Twitter page declaring the claims as “unsubstantiated” and indicating that “mail-in
ballots are very rarely linked to voter fraud” (“Trump Makes Unsubstantiated Claim”)
While the tweets by themselves would perhaps provide grounds for a discussion of
postrhetorical communication in Trump’s signature style, the label by Twitter is the
novelty that makes this post worthy of unique contemplation. To best demonstrate how
the post’s rhetorical effectiveness is altered and determined by the application of a
misinformation label, I will first analyze the post itself and then describe how the
application of a label affects this rhetorical communication in context of the
postrhetorical presidency.
The Post Itself
As mentioned, the post I will be analyzing is an exemplar of President Trump’s
Twitter rhetoric made especially significant by the novel application of a misinformation
label. In considering the strengths and weaknesses of the post, I will first ignore the
presence of the attached label so as to highlight aspects inherent to Trump’s
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Figure 1: President Trump’s Twitter Post with the Accompanying Misinformation Label.
Image credit:“Twitter adds a warning label fact-checking Trump’s false voting claims.” TechCrunch, 26
May 2020, www.techcrunch.com/2020/05/26/twitter-trump-labels-fact-checking-tweet/.
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postrhetorical presidential style. I will discuss the moves he makes to communicate
strength and certainty, establish a wide audience, and engage his political base. I will then
move on to complicate these subjects with recognition of the applied label.
The certainty and strength projected in this post is a signature of Donald Trump’s
messaging. Though many politicians find their success while projecting confidence,
virility, and conviction, Trump is a figure who seems especially concerned with
communicating strength in all his dealings. This post is no exception. Opening with a
brazen absolute in all-caps—“There is NO WAY”—and then doubling down with a
synonymous parenthetical, similarly capitalized—“(ZERO!)”—indicates complete
certainty in the claims to come. Likewise, using the certainty of the modal verb will in
place of may offers no question as to whether or not these drastic consequences will arise;
we the audiences are repeatedly told that they will in all but the last two-word sentence,
providing extensive repetition of the certainty of the unavoidable and undesirable future
events. While, as observed, the opening of this thread makes use of all-caps, this use is
minor when compared to similar posts written exclusively in all-caps. To audiences who
have seen other Trump posts, these claims may benefit from appearing not only strong
and certain, but also restrained in their certainty and more palatable for audiences
uninterested in great bravado. The organization of the post suggests a more studied take
on the subject as well—the post opens with a claim, provides its predictions, and closes
with a reiteration of its thesis: “This will be a Rigged Election.” While lacking the
presentation of evidence for its claims, the trace elements of traditional composition in
this duo of posts imparts a feeling of rhetorical authority that allows audiences to feel
more certain the speaker is arguing from a rational, informed standpoint. The final major
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sentence, leaving the audience with a thesis statement, imparts the message of the posts
as a certainty predicted by the man in the country’s highest political office.
In order to have his message of certainty reach a large audience, Trump leaves the
post accessible to as large an audience as possible. As mentioned earlier, a post seeking a
‘wide audience’ for Trump is unlikely to be overly concerned with catering to his staunch
political opponents, such as consistently-Democratic voters; a message intending to reach
non-supporters would be successful so long as it allowed identification with political
moderates and conservatives not yet committed to his cause. One way that Trump seeks
out this audience is through his treatment of the California mail-in voting system. By
referring to “The Governor of California,” Trump removes a potential knowledge barrier
for some of his intended audience by not referring to the governor by name—while a
mention of Gavin Newsom, not a particularly household name at this time, may have
excluded certain audience members through the inclusion of an unrecognized variable,
the descriptor of office (though heavier in precious characters) allows all viewers to
understand the context. Also relevant is the state chosen for this attack: California is one
of the most securely blue states in the nation. While the mail-in voting laws described in
the post are not unique to this state (8 other states and D.C. automatically mailed out
ballots to voters) (Love et al.), Trump did not have much chance to win California
overall—by selecting California as the target for his attack, he kept his audience wide in
conservative Utah and battleground Nevada (which had similar laws) by not risking
alienating voters with a jab at their state. The very last thing a politician would want in
the months before an election is to offend voters in a state that he may have a chance at
winning. Trump kept his audience wide and focused his nationwide audience on the core
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of his message: the drastic consequences mail-in ballots will introduce into the election.
Though Trump takes measures to include all his audience, he makes sure to
engage his supporters through mentions of their prioritized issues. By referring to
robbery, forgery, and other ballot-based illegalities, Trump creates a direct connection
between mail-in voting and an increase in crime—a great concern to the party of ‘law and
order.’ By describing how California will send ballots to “anyone . . . living in the state,
no matter who they are or how they got there,” Trump ensures that any audience
members concerned about undocumented immigration and border security will oppose
this process by believing it to allow non-U.S. citizens to fraudulently influence the
election. What’s more, this particular affliction is being brought on by the leader of one
of the bluest states in the nation—just another symbol to supporters that the opposing
party is irresponsible and untrustworthy. Lastly, by describing how the mailed ballots will
be followed up by government agents “telling all of these people . . . how, and for whom,
to vote,” Trump calls on a mistrust of—and desire to restrict—big government visiting
homes and determining individuals’ choice. Including some of his major political calling
cards, popular among his supporters—and directly stating that mail-in ballots will lead to
a worsening of all these undesirable elements—Trump ensures that his supporters will
join him in opposing the validity of this election system as he has described it.
Reading the Label
Though President Trump had made prior posts and claims saying that the 2020
election was certain to be rigged and expressing his mistrust of mail-in ballots,1 the May
26th post was the first time that Twitter (or any major social media company) applied a

1

E.g. @realDonaldTrump. Twitter, 24 May 2020, 10:08 a.m.
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misinformation label to the U.S. president since its creation in 2006. In describing this
post’s function, I observed how it sought to convey strength and certainty, reach a general
audience, and engage supporters; the historic and novel application of a misinformation
label greatly affects each of these categories. The interaction of the Twitter-imposed label
and the rhetorical tools used by the president indicate much of the opportunities,
challenges, and constraints of postrhetorical presidential communication.
While Trump uses a well-oiled combination of his typical methods to convey
certainty and strength, the application of a misinformation label undermines much of
these tactics’ effect. In my analysis, I observed how the opening bravado, the repetition
of a certain will, and a nod to conventional composition all contributed to a post that,
though lacking a presentation of evidence, communicated an authoritative voice against
the use of mail-in ballots. Twitter’s label counteracts these effects by raising uncertainty
in the validity of the president’s claims and concerns. A label reading “Get the facts about
mail-in ballots” attached to a post berating such systems as “substantially fraudulent” is
not to be interpreted as an invitation supporting the speaker’s claims. The mere
application of such a label, where none such has ever been before applied to a
presidential figure, implies an enormous necessity for correction that casts doubt on the
arguments presented in the post. Postrhetorical presidential communication thrives when
it can avoid intervening interpretation; this is a driving purpose behind avoiding
mainstream media. Here, we see Twitter taking on some responsibility for the
interpretation of the president’s messaging; instead of allowing the president to
unilaterally interpret the events surrounding mail-in ballots to create “waves of
disinformation[] and cascades of confusion-causing misdirection,” Twitter provides an
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interpretation, from a place of authority over its own site and referencing other sources,
that establishes the ground on which the president’s claims will stand or fall (Hartnett and
Mercieca 600). This simple label takes from the president much of the persuasive power
he mustered through his perceived authority. The one-sentence addendum of this post’s
misinformation label goes far in subverting the rhetorical tools that the president uses to
communicate strength and certainty.
As Trump makes efforts to allow a general Twitter audience to approach his post,
Twitter’s application of a misinformation label restricts the members of that audience that
are likely to find his messaging effective. While Trump was already limited in terms of
persuadable audience to political moderates and conservatives, the misinformation label
applied to these posts serves to distance him from non-supportive audiences. With the
large and unsupported claims that Trump made in these posts, he appears to be mostly
ignoring appeals to logos in favor of inciting outrage through pathos (such as his
description of mail-in ballots’ negative effects) and the strength of his ethos. His
dependency upon ethos in his claims is not unique in the postrhetorical presidency; ethos
may be considered the “primary criterion for presidential success” during the
postrhetorical presidency (Gronbeck 44). It is extremely consequential, then, that the
ethos Trump brings to these posts is largely undermined by the application of a warning
label suggesting his content is not to be trusted or believed. The entire purpose of this
label’s application is to reduce the number of audience members willing to believe the
president’s claims without further evidence. The only circumstance in which an audience
member is unlikely to have their esteem for the president and his claims weakened in this
case is if the audience member already has a higher trust in the president’s ethos than in
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that of Twitter or any of the other information outlets cited in the label—an audience
subgroup that instinct dictates must largely be made up of those already supporting or
highly sympathetic to Trump’s claims. What’s more, the applied misinformation label,
even with a brief glance, draws the eye before the post itself with its bright color and
prominent exclamation point icon—a symbol closely associated with warnings and alerts
of danger, such as on vehicle dashboards or computer pop-ups. The effect of the label,
then, is to negatively flavor the audience’s perception of the president’s ethos (at least in
these posts) before they encounter the text itself. Whereas the postrhetorical presidency
finds strength in achieving a feeling of intimacy with its audience (Mercieca 207), this
label prominently stands between the president’s messaging and the reader. In this post,
the warning label has begun to shuffle Trump back towards the limitations of the
rhetorical presidency by damaging trust in his character and placing a layer of
interpretation between him and the public.
While the range of audience members that may be effectively persuaded by these
posts is limited because of the label’s application, identifying the posts as misinformation
is unlikely to have a large effect on the post’s reception among the president’s supporters
because of their disposition to trust Trump’s claims over media’s fact-checking. It is
well-evidenced that Trump voters will typically stand by the president when he faces off
with media authorities. He has repeatedly labeled the “FAKE NEWS media” as “the
enemy of the American People”2 and has made countless attacks on news media sources
as well as individual reporters, to great popularity among his voters (Roig-Franzia et al.).
According to a 2019 poll, 51% of Trump’s Republican base agreed with his sentiment

2

E.g. @realDonaldTrump. Twitter, 17 Feb. 2017, 4:48 p.m.; 5 Aug. 2018, 7:38 a.m.; 19 Mar. 2019, 8:24
a.m.; 20 May 2019, 7:20 a.m.
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that the press was an “enemy of the people” (“Poll: One-Third Say Media Is ‘Enemy of
the People’”) and polls repeated throughout 2017 and 2018 reveal that approximately
75% of Republicans trusted Trump to tell the truth over mainstream media outlets
(Bump). These sources demonstrate that, prior to the misinformation label’s application,
Trump supporters were prepared to trust him over other media sources and fact-checkers.
Within hours of the label’s imposition on his posts, Trump blasts Twitter for their
intervention, associating them with the “Fake News” outlets that he has so often criticized
(@realDonaldTrump. 26 May 2020, 7:40 p.m.). Creating this association with a group
that his supporters already distrust weakens the social media’s intervention. Trump also
accuses Twitter of “interfering in the 2020 Presidential Election,” building upon his
original claim that the election’s outcome will be fraudulent (@realDonaldTrump. 26
May 2020, 7:40 p.m.). In this way, and to some of this audience at least, the label meant
to weaken Trump’s persuasive power may lend it additional weight as proof of the
alleged fraud. The resilience of Trump’s supporters to even the attempted fact-checking
of the media site on which the president is communicating belies one of the postrhetorical
presidency’s greatest strengths: the president’s capacity for popularity. While in previous
periods presidents were expected or constrained to be restrained and distant from their
supporters, Trump has built a movement surrounding his own image (Breuninger).
Everything about the postrhetorical presidency is intended to cultivate the emotional
investment of the public as a form of relationship, not merely political interest. Though
Twitter may provide fact-checks and interpose their messaging on to Trump’s, since the
president’s supportive audience has already built a relationship with the speaker or his
messaging before encountering the intervening label, and this relationship encourages a
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distrust of the media, any media fact-checking or other intervention is unlikely to be
effective. These factors taken together indicate that most Trump voters were likely
unaffected by the misinformation label, and perhaps even agitated by the intervention due
to the president’s characterization of such as contributing to the fraud he was claiming.
Examining the president’s dual-post accusation of election fraud, in light of its
being the first application of a misinformation label to a president’s post, provides a
much different reading than the posts alone and unedited. By interjecting with its own
authority and interpretation, Twitter weakens the president’s perceived strength and
certainty. By distancing neutral audiences from the speaker at first sight, the label
restricts the audience willing to trust and engage with the information contained therein.
Due to his postrhetorical popularity, however, Trump maintains a great portion of the
original post’s persuasive power to those who already support him.
Misinformation Labels and the Postrhetorical Presidency
By applying a misinformation label to Trump’s tweets, Twitter explores the
power and limitations of the postrhetorical presidency. Though the president’s posts, by
themselves, may have proven effective and found some ground among neutral and
supportive audiences, Twitter’s intervention greatly reduces the persuasiveness of the
president’s messaging to audiences not already committed to Trump’s cause. In my
analysis, I discovered three key takeaways from this novel artifact that help define
postrhetorical presidential communication, particularly as it interacts with social media
intervention.
First, the presence of intervening interpretation may limit the postrhetorical
presidency’s capacity for misinformation. Current scholarship recognizes one of the

25

hallmarks of a postrhetorical presidency as the speaker’s capacity to “go around the news
filter to speak directly to supporters” (Mercieca 207). Without the presence of a strong
media filter, it has been observed how presidents may define public discourse through
“ubiquitous public chatter, waves of disinformation, and cascades of confusion-causing
misdirection” (Hartnett and Mercieca 600). However, before Twitter applied this first
misinformation label, there had been no opportunity to analyze the strength of social
medias’ potential reapplication of the media filter inherent during the era of the rhetorical
presidency. From this analysis, I observe that social media intervention in postrhetorical
presidential discourse is largely capable of reimplementing a media filter that reduces
presidents’ capacities for postrhetorical communication. As in the artifact that I analyzed,
applying warnings and labels to presidential discourse weakens the rhetorical strength of
unsubstantiated noise; even stronger responses, such as Twitter’s later decisions to hide
posts from public view or even ban President Trump, are even more decisive examples of
a social media’s ability to implement filters on a president’s ability to elect when, where,
and with what information they may communicate to the American public. Though it
would be inaccurate to say that such intervention forces a president to revert to a
rhetorical presidency in place of a postrhetorical one, social media’s capacity to filter
presidential communication has now been explicitly proven.
Second, social media can most effectively intervene with postrhetorical
communication by targeting a president’s ethos. As political scholars have indicated,
“much of American politics has been telescoped down to the moral and patriotic—to a
question of ethos” (Gronbeck 44). In no situation is this more true than in consideration
of the postrhetorical presidency. While previous scholars have indicated the increasing
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importance of ethos through all eras of presidential communication, there has been little
discussion of how media censorship interacts with a president’s ethos. In my analysis, I
found that a key result of social media intervention through the application of
misinformation labels is indeed a direct reduction of a president’s perceived character and
reliability. Since postrhetorical presidential communication is so dependent upon the
perception of intimacy and direct communication with the public, presidents are made
more human and more fallible than ever before (40, 44–5). Through hampering a
president’s exposed ethos, social media intervention can reduce one of a modern
president’s greatest assets.
Third, due to the postrhetorical presidency’s contentious relationship with the
press, media interventions are intrinsically weakened. The postrhetorical presidency is
characterized in scholarship by a president–press relationship that is “independent,
competitive, and unstable” (Mercieca 207). In practice, attacks and snubs against the
media were a strong pattern during President Trump’s presidency, leading to widespread
distrust of news media (Bump). Following the advent of social media intervention in
presidential rhetoric, similar numbers have been reported for distrust of social media
censorship (Vogels et al.). In my analysis, I discussed how this weakening of trust in the
media may lead to a decrease in the effectiveness of media misinformation labels. It is
my observation that, due to an antagonistic relationship with the press during the
postrhetorical presidency, social media intervention is likely to be weaker than
comparable media intervention or fact-checking during previous periods of presidential
communication. Rising mistrust of social media and the journalistic sources it is likely to
cite in fact-checking labels (as in this paper’s selected artifact) reduces the potential
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strength of social media responses to misinformation.
The postrhetorical presidency is still in its infancy—having only now entered into
its fourth iteration with the election of President Biden—yet it has already left its scars in
the halls of our government and in our online forums. The evolution of the postrhetorical
presidency witnessed over the past few presidential terms has been enormous and has
revealed many of the unique opportunities and dangers of its function. In this paper, I
performed dual rhetorical analyses to illustrate the function of social media
misinformation labels on one particular set of tweets by President Trump and have
identified three takeaways that help to clarify and expand scholarly definition of the
postrhetorical presidency.
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